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COMMENTS
International Contracts Under the Conflict
of Laws Rules of Great Britain
and Japan
I.

INTRODUCTION

A critical consideration in the drafting of any international contract is the choice of its governing law. Significant differences may
exist among both the substantive contract law and the conflict of laws
rules of the potential forums. I A contract or contractual term which is
enforceable in one legal system may be unenforceable in another. 2 To
alleviate potential conflict of laws problems, parties may contractually
agree that the laws of a certain country are to govern in the event of a
dispute. Even such an express choice of law, however, gains force and
effect through the conflict of law rules of the forum country.
This Comment will familiarize the reader with the English and
Japanese conflict of law rules concerning international contracts and
will compare and analyze these general rules. These two countries
were selected because of the basic difference in their legal systems.
Moreover, conflict of law problems are likely to arise in these nations
because they are island economies and international trade is particu3
larly important to their economic well-being.
1. "Forum" or "forum country" denotes the couary where litigation concerning the
contract has been or will be commenced.
2. For example, it is simple to make a contract enforceable under Japanese law because
there is no concept of consideration and no statute of frauds. Kitagawa, Contract Law in
General, in 3 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 111-1, 1-23 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Kitagawa I].
3. The impact of international trade on the economies of England and Japan is demonstrated by international trade statistics.
In 1980, the United Kingdom imported
$117,902,094,000 in commodities and exported $114,380,488,000 in commodities. At the
same time, Japan imported $140,527,652,000 and exported $129,807,025,000 in commodities.
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS STATISTICAL OFFICE, 1980 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 984, 987, 532,
534 (1981) (all amounts in United States dollars). By comparison, the United States exported
$12,694 million worth of goods to the United Kingdom and $20,790 million to Japan in 1980.
In the same year, the United States imported $9,842 million worth of goods from the United
Kingdom and $30,714 million from Japan. Based upon worldwide import-export figures for
the United States, exports to the United Kingdom represented approximately 5.75% of the
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Since the Japanese legal system may be unfamiliar to some readers, Part II will discuss the sources of Japanese conflict of law rules.
In Part III, the general rules that govern the validity of choice of law
clauses in Great Britain and Japan will be addressed. The rules that
determine the "proper law' 4 of the contract in absence of such a
clause will then be discussed in Part IV. After setting forth these general rules, Part V will address the limitations on these rules in terms
of their relationship to both particular contractual issues and particular types of contracts. The role of "public policy" as a special limitation upon the general conflict rules relating to contracts will be
discussed in Part VI. Finally, these rules will be compared and placed
in an analytical framework.
II.

SOURCES

OF JAPANESE CONFLICT OF LAW RULES

Due to the basic differences between the English common law
system and the Japanese civil law system, it is appropriate initially to
delineate the sources of Japanese conflict of law rules. Unlike Great
Britain, Japan's conflict of law rules are primarily found in statutes.
The primary source is the Hdrei, or Law Concerning the Law on the
Application of Laws, 5 which originated in German law. 6 Various
trade regulations, foreign exchange restrictions, foreign investment
controls, antitrust regulations and other legislation, however, may
total United States exports in 1980 and exports to Japan represented 9.42%. Imports from the
United Kingdom represented approximately 4.02% of total United States imports in 1980 and
imports from Japan represented approximately 12.54%. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1982-83, at 836-38
(103d ed. 1982).
4. The "proper law of the contract" is "a convenient and succinct expression" used by
commentators and some courts to describe the laws of a given legal system which the court
holds applicable to govern most matters arising out of or related to a specific contract. P.
NORTH, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (10th ed. 1979).
Stated another way, the "proper law" means "the system of law which governs the interpretation and the validity of the contract and the mode of performance and the consequences of
breaches of the contract." Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienne
de Navigation S.A., 1971 A.C. 572, 603, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 389, 411, [1970] 2 All E.R. 71, 91
(opinion of Lord Diplock). The proper law is, of course, determined by reference to the forum's conflict of law rules.
5. Law No. 10of June 21, 1898, as amended by Law No. 7 of 1942 and Law No. 223 of
1947, translated in A. EHRENZWEIG, S. IKEHARA & N. JENSEN, AMERICAN-JAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW Appendix A, at 115 (1964) [hereinafter cited as AMERICANJAPANESE PILl, and in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN Appendix 3B (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1984). All
further references to the Hirei shall be from the translation in AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL.
6. Egawa, PrivateInternationalLaw as it is Studied in Japan, 1 JAPAN SC. REV. 59, 61
(1950). In fact, the later advancement of Japanese conflict of law rules was strongly influenced
by European conflict rules, particularly those of Germany and France. Id. at 62.
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also affect the validity or enforceability of the contract.7
Resolution of conflict of law problems may also turn upon principles found in Japanese case law and custom. Case law plays an especially significant role by interpreting and complementing the rather
sparse provisions of the Hirei.8 The role of custom, 9 on the other
hand, is less important as its use is restricted under Article 2 of the
Hdrei. Article 2 provides that "customs not contrary to public policy
and good morals have the force of law to the extent they are recognized by statute or ordinance, or concern matters not otherwise covered by statute or ordinance."' 0 The result is that custom is usually a
"subsidiary source of law," applied only in the absence of other
sources of law."
III.

EXPRESS CHOICE OF THE PROPER LAW

The simplest way to avoid uncertainty regarding the proper law
7.

Fujita, TransnationalLitigation-Conflictof Laws, in 7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN

XIV 5-1, XIV 5-52 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Fujita]. See generally Fujita,
Japanese Regulation of Foreign Transactions and Private-Law Consequences, 18 N.Y.L. FoRUM 317 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Japanese Regulations]. See also infra note 185.
8. Yamada, PrivateInternationalLaw, 7 JAPAN ANN. L. & POL. 129, 135 (1959). Japan
is a civil law country and theoretically no judge is bound by any judicial precedent (except a
lower court by a decision of a higher court in the same case). Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO
JAPANESE LAW 226 (A. Angelo trans. & ed. 1976). However, if a judge refused to follow a

well established hanei ho (the body of rules built up by judicial interpretation of a particular
piece of legislation), he would undoubtedly be reversed on appeal. Id. at 225-26. In general,
the importance of case law varies depending upon the branch of law, but it has long played an
important role in commercial and civil law. Id. at 257, 277.
9. One Japanese scholar defines "custom" as "those rules of conduct which are generally followed in a society. . . [and] are rules of popular origin formed unconsciously by the
force of habit." Y. NODA, supra note 8, at 217. In Japan, the judge's function is to provide a
"reasonable solution" to social conflicts that arise. Id. at 188, 221-22. He is not required to
apply existing rules at the expense of a "reasonable solution" to the case at hand. Id. Therefore, in order to reach a proper solution, judgments often rely upon customary rules that are
incompatible with imperative or statutory rules. Id. at 221.
10.

Hdrei art. 2, translated in AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115.

11. Y. NODA, supra note 8, at 219. Jori is another source of law in Japan but it is not
explicitly mentioned in the context of sources of conflict of law rules. See id. at 222-24. Jori is
defined as "natural law" and "written reason" or general principles of law. Id. Although it is
universally accepted as a basis for a judgment in Japan, it is most commonly used to test the
rationality of applicable'legislation to ensure a rational solution. Id. For a more detailed
discussion of sources of law in Japan and the Japanese legal system, see Y. NODA, supra note 8,
and H. TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM (1976).

For a review of Japan's popular

alternatives to litigation as a method of dispute resolution, see Taniguchi, Dispute Settlement
Framework, in 7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN XIV 1-1 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982); Yamashita,
Compromise, in 7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN XIV 2-1 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982); Yamashita,
Conciliation, in 7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN XIV 3-1 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982); Hattori, Arbitration, in 7 DOING BUSINESs IN JAPAN XIV 4-1 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982).
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of the contract is to include a contractual provision dealing with this
issue. Both Japanese and English conflict of law rules generally allow
the parties to choose which law will govern their contract.12 Allowing
such a choice is consistent with the familiar principle of freedom of

contract. 13
In determining the wording of their contractual choice of law
clause, the parties must initially consider the distinction found in English conflict of law rules between a "party reference" and an "incorporation."' 14 Under a party reference, the parties submit their contract
to the chosen law. 15 In other words, they agree that all disputes arising out of their contract will be governed by the law of a particular
legal system. In contrast, under an incorporation, the parties merely
incorporate selected provisions of a foreign law as terms of the con12. England: P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 199-202; DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 697-98 (J. Morris 8th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as DICEY & MORRIS]; LORD
HAILSHAM, 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1 584, at 407-08 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as HALSBURY'S]; and J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 214-18 (2d ed. 1980).

Japan: Fujita,supra note 7, at XIV 5-52 to 5-32; see Hireiart. 7(1), translated in AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115. See generally Yamada, The Law Applicable to Con-

tracts-The So-Called Principle of PartyAutomony, 1 L. JAPAN ANN. 60 (1967).
13. Yamada, supra note 12, at 63; see also P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 197 (a counterpart
to the laissez faire principle); and Lando, Contracts, 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

(1976).
Freedom of contract remains a fundamental, underlying principle of contract law in Japan. Kitagawa, Contract Law in General,in 1 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 2-1, 2-13 (Z. Kitagawa ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Kitagawa II]; and Kitagawa I, supra note 2, at 11 1-84.
Under it, parties are givenfreedom to make a contract, select the party they will contract with,
decide the terms of the contract, as well as freedom from formal requirements. Kitagawa II,
supra, at 2-13.
The freedom expressed in this underlying principle, however, is restricted by equitable
principles (i.e., public policy, good faith, the rule against abuse of others' rights), as well as
various statutes whose purpose may be to equalize bargaining power, restrict inherently dangerous activities, or simply regulate particular industries and professions. Kitagawa I, supra
note 2, at 11 1-84 to 88. Some of these statutes restrict a party's freedom to make a contract by
imposing a duty to accept particular offers. Id. at 11 1-88. Others may impose certain requirements as to the form of the contract, or restrict a party's right to select with whom he will
contract (i.e., the Anti-Monopoly Act). Id. Finally, some, such as the consumer protection
statutes, restrict the parties' freedom to decide the contractual terms. Id. at 11 1-88 to 89. See
also id. at 11 1-91 to 94 (listing statutes where noncompliance voids the contract).
14. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 202-03; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 701-02; J.
MORRIS, supra note 12, at 218; and Lando, supra note 13, at 13 & n.70 (noting this distinction
is also found in the conflict of laws rules of the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands). There is no indication that this distinction is recognized in Japan. In England,
however, this distinction has been particularly relevant in determining the proper law of shipping contracts that make reference to the United States' Harter Act. The English courts have
typically read such a reference as merely an incorporation. Blom, Choice of Law Methods in
Private InternationalLaw of Contract, 1980 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 161, 170.
15. E.g., Lando, supra note 13, at 13; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 701.
COMPARATIVE LAW 15
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tract-a shorthand alternative to setting out in the contract the actual
provisions of the foreign law.16 The effect of this incorporation, however, is limited to having the foreign law operate as a contractual term
or terms and does not govern all contractual issues in dispute.' 7 An
incorporation presupposes a different proper law and derives its valid18
ity from the provisions of the proper law.
The distinction between a party reference and an incorporation is
important for at least two reasons. First, if there is a party reference,
the mandatory rules of legal systems other than the one chosen by the

parties are disregarded, because the parties' choice is the proper law
of the contract. 19 Under an incorporation, however, the application
of the mandatory protective rules of the proper law of the contract
may limit the effect of the incorporation, because the incorporation
derives its validity from the proper law of the contract. 20 Second,
with a party reference, any changes in the proper law from the time
the contract was made until a dispute arises apply. 2' Thus, what was
once a favorable legal climate could become surprisingly unfavorable.
In contrast, when a foreign statute is incorporated into a contract, it
remains a part of the contract, unaffected by subsequent changes in
22
the law.

16. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 202-03; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 218; Lando,
supra note 13, at 13. Parties who wish to "incorporate" the provisions of a particular law may,
of course, choose one of two alternatives. They may either include in the contract a verbatim
transcript of the particular provision or simply include a general statement that certain rights
and duties will be governed by the particular law. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 203.
The following is a commonly used example of an "incorporation." The parties to a sales
contract agree that the seller's obligation of fitness of goods is to be governed by certain provisions of the French Civil Code. To accomplish this, they can simply refer to these code provisions, rather than attempt to delineate the requirements under those provisions. By this
"incorporation," however, they do not thereby submit all of their contract disputes to French
law. Lando, supra note 13, at 13; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 701-02; and J. MORRIS,
supra note 12, at 218.
Thus, if the parties are unable to agree on the law that is to govern all contract disputes,
incorporation is one avenue for compromise whereby the most strongly desired provisions of
one party's chosen legal system may apply.
17. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 701-02; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 218.
18. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 701-02; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 218; and P.
NORTH, supra note 4, at 203.
19. Lando, supra note 13, at 13-14.
20. Id. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 203; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 701-02;
and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 218.
21. Lando, supra note 13, at 13-14; P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 203; DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 12, at 702-03; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 218.
22. Lando, supra note 13, at 13-14; P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 203; DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 12, at 702-03; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 218. For the remainder of this
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Recognition of Express Choices of Law in England

In 1865, England became the first country to respect the parties'
right to choose the proper law of their contract, and to clearly recognize party automony as the guiding principle in this area. 23 The leading case, Vita Foods Products v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd.,24 reaffirmed
the theory of party autonomy and established the only absolute restrictions under English law upon the parties' right to select the
proper law.
In Vita Foods, the defendant, a Nova Scotian corporation, agreed
to transport a cargo of herring from Newfoundland to New York for
the plaintiff, a New York corporation. During the voyage, however,
the first ship ran aground due to the shipmaster's negligence. As a
result, the goods were damaged when they finally arrived in New
York. The plaintiff sued, contending that the language in the bills of
lading exculpating the defendant from liability due to the shipmaster's
negligence was invalid because the bills of lading failed to include the
required statement that the contract was governed by the Newfoundland Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The bills of lading, however, had
expressly stated that English law was to govern. Since the Newfoundland Act would also have exculpated the defendant, the case centered
upon whether the contract was void for failure to incorporate the
statement and which law should govern that determination.25
The Privy Council first ruled that English law would govern the
dispute, including the effect of the failure to comply with the Newfoundland Act. 26 Speaking for the Council, Lord Wright emphasized
that in England a "fundamental principle" is that the proper law of
the contract "is the law which the parties intended to apply."' 27 After
restating the rule that the parties' intent expressed in a choice of law
clause is "conclusive," he justified it by reasoning:
Where the English rule that intention is the test that applies, and
where there is an expressed statement by the parties of their intention to select the law of the contract, it is difficult to see what qualiComment, the phrase "express choice of law" designates a party reference rather than a mere

incorporation.
23. Lando, supra note 13, at 14-15 (discussing and citing P & 0 Steam Navigation Co. v.
Shand, [1865] 3 Moo. P.C. (n.s.) 272, 291, 16 Eng. Rep. 103, 110, and Lloyd v. Guibert, [1865]

1 Q.B. 115).
24.
25.
26.
27.

1939 A.C. 277, [1939] 1 All E.R. 513.
Id. at 283-89, [1939] 1 All E.R. at 516-20.
Id. at 289-92, [1939] 1 All E.R. at 521-22.
Id. at 289-90, [1939] 1 All E.R. at 521-22.
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fications are possible; provided the intention expressed is bonafide
and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the choice
28
on the ground of public policy.

As to the contention that the choice in this case should be disregarded
because the shipping contract had no connection with its proper
law, 29 the Council found that "[c]onnections with English law [are]
not as a matter of principle necessary." ' 30 In this regard, the Council
noted that international contracts bearing no relationship to England
often had clauses providing for arbitration in England or that English
3
law would govern, and that such clauses were frequently upheld. '
Finally, the court ruled that under English law the contract was not
void for failure to incorporate a clause stating that the contract was
32
subject to the provisions of the Newfoundland Act.
Since Vita Foods continues to control in England, an express
choice of law will be respected by English courts so long as it is "bona
fide and legal" and not contrary to "public policy."'33 It is widely
agreed, however, that the "bona fide and legal" requirement would
invalidate an express choice of law provision where the parties' motive was to evade the adverse consequences of a provision which
would have otherwise been part of the proper law of the contract. 34
The courts may also disregard a choice of law clause where the choice
is "meaningless. ' 3 In addition, despite the dictum in Vita Foods,
28. Id. at 290, [1939] 1 All E.R. at 521 (emphasis added).
29. Id. This contention stems from the fact "that the transaction [was] .
one relating
to the carriage on a Nova Scotian ship of goods from Newfoundland to New York between
residents in these countries." Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. It was also suggested that some contact with England could be construed from
both the fact that the ship which originally carried the goods might have been subject to an
English imperial statute due to its registration, and the fact that it was likely to be insured by
English underwriters. Id. at 291, [1939] 1 All E.R. at 521.
32. Id. at 292-300, [1939] 1 All E.R. at 522-28.
33. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 201-02; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 584, at 407-08. See
DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 697-701; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 217-18.
34. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 201; DiCEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 699; HALSaURY'S, supra note 12,
584, at 407; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 217.
35. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 202; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
584, at 408. For
example, in Compagnie d'Armement v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A., [1969] 1
W.L.R. 1338, [1969] 2 All E.R. 589 (C.A.), the court of appeal held that a clause stating that
the shipping contract was to be "governed by the laws of the flag of the vessel carrying the
goods" was meaningless and inapplicable because a number of different ships, each flying different flags, had carried the cargo in dispute. This decision was reversed by the House of
Lords on the ground that French, not English, law was the proper law of the contract. 1971
A.C. 572, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 389, [1970] 3 All E.R. 70. Yet, the Lords disagreed as to the effect
of the clause and each used a different rationale to determine that the proper law of the con-
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there has been controversy as to whether connection between the
proper law and the contract is required. Although the law in this
respect remains less than clear, 36 no English court has ever refused to
37
give effect to a choice of law clause solely on this ground.
B.

Recognition of Express Choices of Law in Japan

In Japan, as in England, contracting parties are allowed to select
the proper law of their contract through a choice of law clause. 38 Article 7(1) of the Hdrei provides that "[tihe intention of the parties
shall determine what country's law will govern the creation and effect
of a juristic act."' 39 A juristic act within the meaning of the Hdrei is
an act which effects a legal consequence according to the manifestation of the intent of the parties, such as a contract or a waiver and
release. 40 Thus, with a few exceptions, the principle of party autonomy extends to all types of contracts and contractual issues without
restrictions such as a "bona fide and legal" choice or a nexus between
the chosen law and the contract. 41 Of course, the rule that a court
will not give effect to an express choice of law where it would violate
42
public policy is an ever-present restriction.
Although Japanese law presently places no restrictions other
than public policy upon the parties' contractual choice of law, Japanese commentators have proposed various theories to limit the use of
choice of law clauses. The "qualitative restriction" theory attempts to
limit the parties' choice of the proper law to the area of dispositive
law so that the parties cannot evade mandatory or imperative provitract was French law. Id. at 582-609, [1970] 3 W.L.R. at 392-417, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 72-96.
Thus, the court of appeal's decision may still have some effect, particularly since Lord Wilberforce agreed that the clause was meaningless and inapplicable, and Lord Ried similarly found
it to be ineffective. Id. at 583, 595, [1970] 3 W.L.R. at 393, 404, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 74, 84.
36. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 201-02; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 697-701;
HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
584, at 407-08; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 217-18.
37. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 699; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 217. See also
Blom, supra note 14, at 165-66 (discussing dicta supporting such a view but disregarding the
requirement because of lack of authority).
38. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-53; AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 47; and
Yamada, supra note 12, at 61-62.
39. Hdrei art. 7(1), translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115.
40. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-53.
41. Id. See also Yamada, supra note 12, at 68.
42. Yamada, supra note 12, at 68; Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-76 to 77. See Hdrei art.
30, translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 117 (Article 30 provides: "The
law of a foreign country shall not govern if its provisions are contrary to public policy and
good morals"). The role of public policy is discussed infra at notes 162-89 and accompanying
text.
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sions of what would otherwise be the proper law. 43 A criticism of this
theory, however, is that it denies party autonomy by presupposing the
existence of a specific legal system to otherwise govern the contract
and determine which provisions are imperative or mandatory and
which are dispositive. 44 The English rule requiring a "bona fide"
choice of law has also been advocated in Japan. 45 This theory has
been criticized on the ground that the parties' motives are immaterial
once the parties are granted the freedom to designate a proper law. 46
Commentators have also suggested implementing the rule advocated
in England that would limit the parties' choice to legal systems having
a close connection with the contract. 47 Critics believe this "quantitative restriction" theory may be unrealistic because international contracts often do not have a noticeable or especially close connection
with any particular legal system-itself a justification for allowing the
48
parties freedom.
Adhesion contracts have also been a topic of great concern
among Japanese commentators. Some have suggested that choice of
law provisions should not be permitted in adhesion contracts because
the choice will inevitably be unilateral. 49 Instead, they suggest that
adhesion contracts be governed by the law of the place of the business
establishment. 50 This solution, however, has been criticized for unnecessarily eliminating party autonomy when the same effect can be
gained by accepting the express choice of law and then applying only
the rules of the other legal system that are specifically designed to
protect the weaker party. 51
While no limiting theory has been expressly adopted by the Japanese courts, it has been suggested that Japanese courts would draw a
distinction between contracts of parties with equal bargaining power
and contracts of adhesion. 52 This distinction is grounded upon the
assumption that the principle of party autonomy embodied in Article
43.

Yamada, supra note 12, at 65.

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.

48.

Id. at 66-67.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. at 67.

51.
52.

Id. at 67-68.
AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 48 (suggesting that Japanese courts

would apply a "validating law" to govern a contract where the parties were of equal bargaining
power, but not if the contract was one of adhesion).

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J

[Vol. 7:193

7(1) of the Hdrei does not apply to adhesion53 contracts if its application would circumvent Japanese legislation.
C. Analysis of the Recognition of Choice of Law Clauses
The parties' express choice of the proper law is generally recognized worldwide, 54 probably because of its inherent virtues: certainty
and predictability. Parties to international contracts are rarely able to
foresee the forum for their dispute. Thus, due to the worldwide divergence of conflict rules, the parties are usually unable to predict what
the proper law would be absent a choice of law clause. Since a choice
of law clause is generally recognized around the world, however, it
can provide the necessary degree of certainty and predictability. 5
The rule can also be justified on the ground that it implicitly recognizes that parties may have both a genuine need and credible motives for their selection of one country as the proper law. 56 Given the
underlying principle of laissez faire, it would be hypocritical to grant
parties the freedom to contract, yet deny them the opportunity to
fully exercise that right by declaring them incompetent to select the
proper law which reflects their needs and motives. In fact, parties
entering into international contracts may negotiate and bargain over
the proper law with as much vigor as they negotiate over the substantive terms of the contract.57 Considering the parties' needs, the interests of international trade demand a certain degree of freedom to
ensure predictability in order to keep the exchange of goods and service unhampered.58
Given these advantages, one might legitimately wonder why
rules have been adopted and theories advanced for restricting the parties' freedom. First, there is a recognition that countries other than
the forum country and the country whose law is the proper law may
have an interest in the resolution of the dispute. Specifically, the in53.

Id. at 48 n.227.

54. Lando, supra note 13, at 33.
55. E. RABEL, 2 CONFLICT OF LAWS 365 (2d ed. 1960) (reasoning that party autonomy
"endeavors to obviate the unpredictable findings of unforeseeable tribunals and to consolidate
the contract under one law while negotiation is in course"); Lando, supra note 13, at 33.

56. For instance, a particular law may be selected because: (1) a certain formula is internationally known; (2) the selected law dominates the market; (3) the selected law is "neutral";
(4) the selected law is particularly well developed and well suited to the specific contract; or
(5) the selected law was used in earlier transactions between the parties. Lando, supra note 13,
at 33.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 41.
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terests of the legal system most closely connected factually and socially with the contract may demand application of its mandatory
rules to ensure that the legitimate governmental interests (i.e., protection of the weaker contracting party) are not thwarted. 59 Those interests of comity must be balanced with the need for predictability in
international trade to determine the appropriate restrictions. Additionally, or as part of the interests of comity, is the present primary
concern that inequalities in bargaining power may lead to abusive
choices of law by the stronger party to the contract. 6° The most important question, however, is whether the limiting rules and theories
adequately reflect the proper balance between the interest of comity,
the concern over abusive choices, and freedom of international trade.
The requirement that the chosen law have some connection with
the contract has been unsuccessfully advocated in both England and
Japan. Assuming, arguendo, that this theory would promote the interests of comity to some degree and provide some protection against
abusive choices, there are four main difficulties with this theory when
applied to all contracts. First, in order to retain some degree of predictability, one would have to articulate the particular type of connection with the contract that would be sufficient to meet this
requirement. 61 Moreover, some degree of variation in the establishment of this minimum connection would probably be required depending upon the type of contract involved. Second, even if
acceptable minimum connections standards could be delineated, they
might unreasonably and unnecessarily limit the parties' choice of the
proper law. 62 Third, the theory does not recognize that there may be
legitimate, credible reasons for choosing a legal system unconnected
to the contract. 63 Finally, it does not adequately protect against evasive choices of law, because parties who intentionally select an unconnected proper law need only construct some connection between the
chosen law and the contract to avoid the rule. 64 As a result, this the59. Id.
60. Id. at 35-38. The principle of laissezfaire has been somewhat eroded worldwide in
recent years by the recognition that inequality in bargaining power may exist. See, e.g., supra
note 14; and The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, reprinted in 47 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF
ENGLAND 86 (3d ed. 1978). Consequently, the concern that there may be abusive choices of
the proper law could be due to the interest of the forum in somehow protecting its policies
against adhesion contracts and/or the interest of comity.
61. Cf Lando, supra note 13, at 35.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 36.

64. Id.
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ory has also failed to gain significant worldwide acceptance. 65
The requirement that the selection of the governing law be "bona
fide"-that is, a selection made without evasive intent and requiring a
reasonable basis for the selection 66-has gained increasing acceptance
worldwide since its inception in England. 67 While this restriction
may be appropriate for international commercial contracts where inequality of bargaining power is usually not present, 6s Ole Lando, a
leading commentator, argues that it does not provide sufficient protec69
tion for the weaker party to an adhesion contract.
Instead, Lando advocates the adoption of a theory that distinguishes between contracts where the parties are likely to be of unequal
bargaining power and those where such power is roughly equal.
Where bargaining power is likely to be equal, for example in international commercial sales, leasing, agency and distribution contracts, he
suggests that the parties' choice should be presumed to be valid and
determinative. This presumption could only be rebutted by proving
that the choice was made mala fide-that the parties had "morally
impeachable or anomalous and unreasonable intentions. '70 For contracts where unequal bargaining power is likely to be involved, he
suggests that the parties' choice be restricted to a set of presumed

proper laws designed to fit the particular type of contract. The parties
would, however, be permitted to deviate from the presumed proper
law if the law selected has considerableconnection with the contract,
so that the protection that would have been afforded under the pre71
sumed proper law will be assured.
65. While this theory is embodied in the Polish conflicts of law statute and has been
mentioned in some American and older West German cases, it has been rejected by a number
of countries, including Switzerland, France, and Italy, as well as by Japan and England. It is
also unlikely to be followed in Russia or Czechoslovakia. Id. at 36-37.
66. For examples of reasonable, nonevasive bases for the choice, see supra note 56.
67. Lando, supra note 13, at 36-37. For example, this principle has also been applied in
France and Switzerland, and is incorporated in both the American RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICTS LAW § 187(2)(a) (1971), and Article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to International Sales of Goods; it would probably be followed even in Russia. Id.
68. E.g., J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 218. See also Lando, supra note 13, at 41.
69. Lando, supra note 13, at 37. First, it fails to recognize that the selected law may clash
with the mandatory protective rules of the legal system most closely connected to the contract,
even though there was a reasonable, nonevasive intent behind the selection. Second, it still
permits an almost unrestricted freedom which gives the stronger party a powerful bargaining
tool against the weaker party. Id.
70. Id. at 42.
71. Id. at 42-43. Lando suggests that: (1) the law of the place of work will be presumed
to be the proper law for employment contracts; (2) the law of the insured's domicile will be
presumed to be the proper law of insurance contracts; (3) the law of the place where the goods
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PROPER LAW IN ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS CHOICE OF LAW

IV.

If the parties to a contract have not expressly chosen the proper
law, 72

both English and Japanese courts attempt to discern the par-

ties' implied intent regarding the proper law from the circumstances
of the case. 73 The two countries differ, however, in their determination of the proper law when the parties' intent is not expressed and
cannot be implied or inferred.
English Rules Applied in Absence of an Express Choice
In the absence of an express selection, English courts will first
attempt to infer the parties' intent from the circumstances of the case
and the terms and nature of the contract in light of sound business
considerations. 74 Usually, a court will consider a jurisdiction or arbitration clause as an indication that the parties intended the contract
A.

to be governed by the law of that forum. 75 Additionally, in attempt-

will be used will be presumed to be the proper law for consumer contracts for goods; (4) the
law of the situs will be presumed to be the proper law for leases of immovables; and (5) the law
of the country where the risk is located will be presumed to govern contracts for fire or liability
insurance. Id.
72. As used in this Comment, the phrase "in absence of an express choice of law" indicates those conflict rules which apply when the parties have not expressly chosen the governing
law of the contract by including a contractual provision to that effect.
73. England: P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 203; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 704; J.
MORRIS, supra note 12, at 219. See HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 1 585, at 409.
Japan: Yamada, supra note 12, at 70. See also Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-53.
74. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 704-05; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 219. See P.
NORTH, supra note 4, at 203; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, T 585, at 409.
75. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 203; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 585, at 409; and J.
MORRIS, supra note 12, at 219-20. See DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 704-05. Arbitration clauses are not always held to be determinative of the parties' intent. See, e.g., Compagnie
d'Armenent Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A., 1971 A.C. 572,
[1970] 3 W.L.R. 389, [1970] 3 All E.R. 72. In that case, the House of Lords held that the
shipping contract was governed by French law, despite the presence of a clause providing for
arbitration in England. Id. Lord Wilberforce reasoned:
[t]hat the selection of a certain place for arbitration and, by inference, of nationals or
residents of that place as arbitrators, is an indication that the parties intended the law
of that place to govern is a sound general rule. But it should not be treated as giving
rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference, as recent pronouncements appear to
suggest.
A arbitration clause must be treated as an indication, to be considered together
..An
with the rest of the contract and the relevant surrounding facts. Always it will be a
strong indication; often, especially where there are parties of different nationality or a
variety of transactions which may arise under the contract, it will be the only clear
indication. But in some cases it must give way where other indications are clear.
Id. at 596, 600, [1970] 3 W.L.R. at 404-05, 408, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 84, 88. Similarly, Lord
Morris reasoned:
An agreement to refer disputes to arbitration in a particular country may carry with
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ing to discern the parties' intent, the courts have looked to such factors as: (1) the origin of legal terminology used in the contract;
(2) the form of the documents involved in the transaction; (3) the
currency in which payment is to be made; (4) the use of a particular
language; (5) a connection with a preceding transaction; (6) the nature and location of the subject matter of the contract; (7) the residence of the parties; and (8) the fact that one party is a sovereign (the
inference being that the law of that country was intended to be the
proper law).76 Where a contract or one of its terms would be void or
invalid under one system of law, but not under another, the courts
may also infer that the parties intended the validating law to be the
governing law. 77 Nevertheless, courts will be especially cautious in
applying the "validating law" to standard form contracts exhibiting a
78
gross disparity of bargaining power.
When the intention of the parties cannot be discerned, the contract is governed in England by the system of law to which the transit, and is capable of carrying with it, an implication or inference that the parties have
further agreed that the law governing the contract. . . is to be the law of that country. But I cannot agree that this is a necessary or irresistible inference or implication:
there is no inflexible or conclusive rule to the effect that an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration in a particular country carries with it the additional agreement or
necessarily indicates a clear intention that the law governing the matters in dispute is
to be the law of that country. There might be such an additional agreement or there
might not. In many cases there might be. In many cases it will be reasonable to infer
that the parties are so agreed. In other cases the conclusion may well be that the
parties placed confidence in the arbitrament of chosen commercial men in a particular country and their methods and system, while remembering that arbitrators may
be accustomed to and competent to deal with disputes by the application of some
system of law other than that of their country.
Id. at 588, [1970] 3 W.L.R. at 397, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 77-78. Lord Diplock reasoned:
The fact that they have expressly chosen to submit their disputes under the contract
to a particular arbitral forum of itself gives rise to a strong inference that they intended that their mutual rights and obligations under the contract should be determined by reference to the domestic law of the country in which the arbitration takes
place since this is the law with which arbitrators sitting there may be supposed to be
most familiar. But this is an inference only. It may be destroyed by inferences to the
contrary to be drawn from other express provisions of the contract or relevant surrounding circumstances, and those inferences may be so compelling as to lead to the
identification of another system of law which the parties must have intended.
Id. at 604-05, [1970] 3 W.L.R. at 412-13, [1970] 3 All E.R. at 92. The same reasoning could
logically apply to the conclusive effect of a jurisdiction clause.
76. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 205-06; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 705-07, 709;
HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
585, at 409.
77. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 200; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 708; HAtSBURY'S, supra note 12,
586, at 410; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 220.
78. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 709; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 220 (no cases
cited in either authority).
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action has its "closest and most real connection. ' 79 The courts use
this "closest connection" or localization theory to determine what law
"ordinary, reasonable, and sensible businessmen would have been
likely to have had if their minds had been directed to the question."80
Many factors may be taken into consideration under this theory, but
the most prominent are: (1) the place of contracting or performance;
(2) the residence or place of business of the parties; and (3) the nature
and subject matter of the contract.8 1 Attempts have been made to
formulate presumptions based upon case results under this theory in
an effort to provide greater predictability.8 2 The use of presumptions,
is to weigh the relehowever, is disfavored and the modern practice
83
vant factors without the aid of presumptions.
Whether an English court is attempting to determine the proper
law of the contract by discerning the parties' unexpressed intent, or by
using the localization theory because no intent can be discerned, the
84
inquiry is always directed to the time when the contract was made.
Courts, therefore, will not consider the subsequent conduct of the parties in determining the proper law unless the parties have agreed to
modify the original contract, have entered into a new collateral contract, or have engaged in subsequent conduct which amounts to an
85
estoppel.
JapaneseRules Applied in Absence of an Express Choice
In Japan, as in Great Britain, when no express choice has been
made, the parties' implied intent will first be sought out rationally
from the circumstances of the case.8 6 In discerning the parties' implied intent, the Japanese courts consider a number of factors,
B.

P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 208; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 712; HALSsupra note 12, 587, at 410-11; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 220.
80. J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 220. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 208.
81. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 211. There is also some disagreement among jurists as to
whether only "physical" contacts or facts should be considered when "weighing" the contacts,
or whether such things as the style of drafting or the validity or invalidity of contractual
clauses under the potential proper laws should be considered under this theory. Eg., i at
206-10; Blom, supra note 14, at 176-78. See J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 220-22.
82. Eg., DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 712-23.
83. J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 221-22; P. NORTH, surpa note 4, at 210 (presumptions
are of little value). See also HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 1588, at 412 (agreeing that the use of
presumptions is disfavored but suggesting that the place of performance may be determined to
be the proper law if the contract is made in one country but is performed or ought to be
performed in another).
84. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 210; and HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, $ 590, at 413.
85. HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 590, at 413.
86. Yamada, supra note 12, at 70; Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-53.
79.

BURY'S,
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roughly similar to those used by the English courts. These factors
include the form and content of the contract, as well as the language
in which it was written, the parties' nationalities (including the fact
that one party is a sovereign), the subject matter of the contract, and
jurisdiction or arbitration clauses. 87 Further, because Article 7(1) of

the Hdrei is considered inapplicable to adhesion contracts, the Japanese courts, like their English counter-parts, would probably distinguish between adhesion and other contracts by considering the
"validating law"-that law under which the contract would be valid
or enforceable-only if the contract was one between parties of equal
88
bargaining power, but not if the contract was one of adhesion.
A major difference, however, arises between the Japanese and
English conflicts rules where the parties' intent cannot be implied by
the court. While the English courts apply the flexible "closest connection" or localization theory when the parties' intent is not expressed and cannot be inferred, the Japanese courts are obliged to
follow a single, rigid, uniform rule that the place of contracting is the
proper law. 89 Article 7(2) of the Hdrei provides that "[i]f the intention of parties is uncertain, the law of the place of [contracting] shall
govern."9 For contracts made inter absentes, or between persons in
different places, the place from which the offer was made or dispatched governs as the place of contracting or lex loci contractus.91
87. Yamada, supra note 12, at 70 & n.20; Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-53 to 54. Of
course, the court may also look to the conduct of the parties, including conduct after the
contract is formed. For example, in Multi Product Int'l v. Tao Kogyo Co., Tokyo District
Court, Hanreiiib6, No. 863 (1977) at 100, Apr. 22, 1977, translatedin 23 JAPAN. ANN. INT'L
LAW 187, 196 (1979-80), the court found "an implicit agreement between the parties" that
Japanese law was the proper law of the contract because both parties had "expressed. . . an
intent to [that] effect" during pretrial proceedings.
88. AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 48 & n.227. See Bangkok Bank Ltd. v.
Sakurai, Supreme Court, 32 Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu 616, Apr. 20, 1978, translatedin
24 JAPAN. ANN. INT'L L. 109, 111 (noting that the bank deposit contract "has the characteristics of a contract of adhesion" and then finding that the parties impliedly designated Japan as
the proper law of the contract since the foreign bank did business in Japan and the plaintiff was
a Japanese resident at the time of contracting).
89. Hdrei art. 7(2), translated in AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115;
Yamada, supra note 12, at 71-72; Fujita, supra note 6, at XIV 5-54 to 55.
90. Hdrei art. 7(2), translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115.
91. Hdrei art. 9(2), translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115-16. Article 9(2) states:
The creation and effect of a contract are governed by the law of the place from which
the offer is made. If the offeree, at the time of acceptance, does not know from where
the offer was made, the place of the offeror's domicile is deemed to be the place of
[contracting].
See also Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-54 to 55; AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at
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Where one of the parties is a Japanese citizen, however, the court may
be expected to give preference to92 Japanese law by reference to Japanese public policy or otherwise.
The rationale behind this rigid rule is that the place of contracting is presumed to be the proper law that the contracting parties
would typically intend if they had considered it.93 Because this rationale is tied to the principle of party autonomy, it is unclear how far the
court will go to find the parties' implied intent to apply a different
law. 94 Nevertheless, the Japanese courts seem to favor lex loci contractus as the proper law, unless a contrary intention of the parties
can be clearly established. 95
C. Analysis of the Rules Applied in Absence of an Express Choice
Conflict rules applied in absence of an express choice of law may
be classified as either flexible or rigid. The rule that the parties' implied intent controls is an example of a flexible rule. This is the primary rule applicable in both England and Japan, in absence of an
express choice. England's secondary rule-that if the parties' intent
cannot be discerned, the law of the country that is the most "closely
connected" with the contract is the proper law-may also be classified
as a flexible rule. In contrast, Japan's secondary rule-that if the parties' intent cannot be discerned, the law of the place of contracting
governs-is a rigid rule. The contrast between the flexible and rigid
rules reflects the tension betiveen two primary goals. Flexible rules
afford the courts an opportunity to fashion just and equitable rules in
each individual case. Rigid rules, on the other hand, ensure the predictability and certainty necessary to guide contracting parties when
making and performing contracts, although96they may sometimes result in hardship for the individual litigants.
The rule that the presumed intent of the parties controls absent
an express choice of law has both advantages and disadvantages. The
92. AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 48. See supra note 88.
93. Yamada, supra note 12, at 77-78.
94. AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 47.
95. Id. See Yamada, supra note 12, at 72 (criticizing this approach). Cf. Fujita, supra
note 7, at XIV 5-54 (stating that Japanese courts generally will first make some attempt to find
an implied intent before applying the rule of Article 7(2)).
96. See Lando, supra note 13, at 78. The degree of predictability, however, is always
affected by the foreseeability of the forum and the worldwide variation in which laws control in
the absence of an express choice. Unlike the worldwide recognition of express choice of law
clauses, there is considerable variation in the rules that govern in the absence of an express
choice. See id. at 53, 79.
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rule is adaptable in the multitude of unpredictable fact combinations
found in the many varieties of international contracts. Through such
a flexible rule, the court can examine each situation anew and weigh
the facts in a fashion best suited to the individual case. At the same
time, however, the flexibility of the rule makes its application unpredictable and also allows the courts to regularly find that the parties
"intended" the law of the forum to govern the contract. Moreover,
the presumed intent rule has been criticized as a legal fiction because
of the rarity in which a common intent can actually be gleaned from
the particular circumstances of a case. The rule is also criticized on
many of the same grounds as the recognition of choice of law clauses,
such as lack of adequate protection for the weaker party to an adhesion contract. Nevertheless, the rule has thrived since it was first
adopted by several European countries in the nineteenth century, and
97
remains in force around the world.
The rule that a contract is governed by the system to which it is
most closely connected suffers from many of the same infirmities as
the presumed intent rule. This rule can also produce uncertainty as
well as a disproportionate number of decisions where the court concludes the law of the forum is the proper law of the contract. To
remedy this problem, some countries have supplemented this "localization" theory with specific presumptions for specific types of contracts. The English courts, however, randomly enumerate the
relevant contacts, in rejection of this solution. Nevertheless, England's enumeration can give the mistaken impression that the test is
mechanical, "localizing" the contract in the country where it has the
greatest number of relevant contacts. Although this would add a degree of certainty to the rule, in theory the proper law should be determined by weighing rather than simply counting contacts. 98
The rigid secondary rule used in Japan-requiring application of
the law of the place of contracting-lies on the opposite end of the
spectrum. The rule was predominant worldwide during the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, but its popularity
declined as fewer and fewer international contracts were entered into
and performed at the same time and place. Nevertheless, a number of
countries, including Japan, have retained the rule in some context.
Thus, tradition is one explanation for the continued use of this rule. 99
97. See id at 58-59.
98.

See id at 81.

99. See id. at 78-79 (the rule is currently used in some manner in the Soviet Union,
Austria, Italy, Portugal, Taiwan, Iran, and some Latin American countries).
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In addition to its long history, the rule could also be explained
because of its ease of application and the certainty and predictability
it provides. Moreover, under the rule courts are denied the opportunity to show a preference for the law of the forum. Despite these
virtues, however, the rigidity of the rule has inherent disadvantages.
Mechanical application of the law of the place of contracting may
result in inequitable results which ignore the significant and legitimate
interests of other countries which may have greater relation to the
contracting parties, the subject of the contract, or the effects of the
contract. It is possible that the place of contracting has only a de
minimus relationship to the international contract. Thus, the place of
contracting should not be dispositive, but instead merely one factor to
help determine the parties' presumed intent or to "localize" the
contract. 100

Aside from these advantages and disadvantages, the fundamental
difference between their respective legal systems might explain the difference between England's and Japan's rules to determine the proper
law in absence of an express or implied choice by the parties. England's localization theory requires a great deal of interpretation by the
courts to determine which legal system is most closely connected to
the contract. On the other hand, Japan's rule that the law of the place
of contracting governs in such situations seems well suited to a civil
law country, since it requires virtually no interpretation.
V.
A.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROPER LAWS

Application of the ProperLaw to ParticularIssues

With few exceptions, the proper law governs most issues arising
out of a contract under both English and Japanese conflict of law
rules. Issues relating to the creation and formation of a contractoffer and acceptance, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, and consideration-are governed by the "punitive" proper law, that is, the law
that would be the proper law if the contract were validly created.10
100. Cf id. at 54.
101. England: P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 215-19; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at
741-43 (expressing some hesitation with regard to the application of the proper law to the
595,
issues of mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, or duress); HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
596, 598, at 415-16; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 226-28.
Japan: Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-55 to 56. See also Herei art. 7, translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115. But see Akiba, Conflict of Laws, 12 JAPAN-ANN. L.
& POL. 77, 86 (1964) (one Japanese scholar advocates the use of some other law to govern such
pre-contract issues because: (1) "[n]o absolute necessity, logical or practical demands the uni-
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Issues relating to the essential or material validity of the contract, its
10 2
terms, or its "effects" are likewise governed by the proper law.
In England, however, the illegality of a contract may be determined by reference to four different laws: the place of contracting,
the place of performance, the lex fori (the law of the forum), and the
proper law. 0 3 For example, a contract which is invalid under the
proper law would be unenforceable in an English court.'°4 Additionally, contracts are unenforceable in England if they are contrary to
England's public policy or illegal under an English statute having an
extraterritorial effect.105 Finally, there is some uncertainty as to
whether a contract which is illegal under the law of the place of performance can be enforced.' ° 6 Nevertheless, all commentators agree
that a contract will probably be enforceable, even though it is illegal
0 7
under the law of the place of contracting.1
Capacity to contract is also given special mention in both nations. While case law is sparse and there is no decisive rule, there are
three possible laws that might govern this issue in England: the law
of the place of contracting, the law of the parties' domicile, or the
proper law of the contract.' 08 Recent authority, however, indicates
that the proper law, so long as it is "objectively ascertained," governs
capacity. 1°9 Thus, the parties' choice on the issue of capacity is likely
to be limited to the law of the country with the closest connection to
form reference of 'contract' inclusive of offer and acceptance to a single system of law"; and
(2) there are different policy considerations when dealing with such pre-contract issues).
102. England (except for illegality): P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 230-32; DICEY & MOR601, at 418; and J. MORRIS, supra
RIS, supra note 12, at 754-55; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
note 12, at 234-35.
Japan: Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-55 to 56. See also Hdrei art. 7, translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at
103. HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,

115.

603-07, at 419-22; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at
232. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 223-30 (flatly rejecting the law of the place of contracting
as a possibility).
604, at 419; and J.
104. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 224; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
MORRIS, supra note 12, at 232. See DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 755-58.
105. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 225-26; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 730-34;
607, at 421; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 233.
HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
106. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 225-26; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 730-34;
607, at 421; and J. MORRIS,, supra note 12, at 233.
HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
605, 606, at 419-20; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 233107. HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
34. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 226-29 (concluding there is only dicta supporting this
rule); DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 756-57.
108. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 221; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 744-48; and
HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
599, at 416; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 229, 231-32.
109. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 222; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 744, 745, 748;
and HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
599, at 416. Cf J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 232 (sug-

1984]

InternationalContracts

the contract.110 In Japan, this issue is governed by special provisions
of the Hdrei. Under Article 3(1) and (2), capacity to contract is governed by the law of the party's nationality."1 ' However, a person legally capable to contract in Japan who makes a contract in Japan is
112
deemed capable of contracting under the doctrine of favor negotii.
Similarly, the Hdrei has special provisions to govern the formalities of a contract that are equivalent to the English common law rules.
In both countries, a contract is formally valid if it complies with the
requirements of the law of the place of contracting or the proper
law. '13 Note, however, that England classifies some formality requirements, such as the Statute of Frauds, as procedural and thus governed
4
by English law. 1

Matters relating to performance and excuses for nonperformance
of a contract also provide some exceptions to the proper law principle.
In England, the proper law generally governs such issues, except that
the mode and minor details of performance are governed by the law of
the place of performance."15

It has been suggested that Japanese

gesting the question is still unresolved, but a court would find a party has the capacity to
contract if it was so found under any of the three laws).
110. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 222; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 744, 745,
599, at 416.
748; and HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
111. Hdrei art. 3(1) & (2), translated in AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115.
Article 3 provides:
(1) The capacity of a person is determined by the law of the country of his
nationality.
(2) An alien who lacks capacity under the law of the country of his nationality, who
performs a juristic act in Japan, and who would have capacity under Japanese law, is
deemed to have capacity, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
(3) The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply to juristic acts governed
by the law of family relations or the law of succession, or to juristic acts concerning
immovables situated abroad.
Id. See also Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-56.
112. Hdrei art. 3(1) & (2), translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115.
See also Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-56.
113. England: P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 219-21; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at
749-54; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 600, at 417; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 228-29.
Japan: Hdrei art. 7, translated in AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 115. Article 8 provides:
(1) The formalities of a juristic act shall be governed by the law governing the effect
of the act.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, compliance with
the formal requirements of the law of the place of acting is sufficient, except where a
juristic act establishes or disposes of a right in rem or a right requiring registration.
Id. See also Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-57 to 58.
114. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 220-21; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 753-54; and
J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 228.
115. HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 602, at 418-19. See J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 235-
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courts would follow this same rule with the mode and minor details of
performance governed by the law of the place of performance, unlike
the more substantive issues of performance which are governed by the
proper law. 1 6 The law of the place of performance, however, is only
applicable to the extent that it does not conflict with the proper law of
7
the contract."1
Issues often arise over the uncertainty of the meaning of contractual terms. Both Japan and England have special rules to govern this
issue. Issues of interpretation are governed in England either by the
law expressly or implicitly chosen by the parties, or the "objectively
ascertained" proper law."" In contrast, Japanese courts determine
the meaning of foreign terminology in a contract by reference to the
law of the country of that language, regardless of the proper law of
the contract.' 1 9
While the proper law governs discharge in both the Japanese and
English systems, 1 20 these two countries vary as to the law governing
the remedies for breach of contract. In Japan, the proper law governs
the remedies for breach of contract.'21 In England, however, the issue
of which law governs remedies is complicated by the substantive/procedural distinction 122 found at common law. For instance, both the
nature of the available remedy and the measure of damages are char116. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-58, 5-55 to 56. See also AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL,
supra note 5, at 49-50.
117. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-58.
118. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 239-40; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 767-70; and
J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 238-39. But see HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 608, at 422 (does
not indicate that the parties' implied choice of law will govern this issue).
119. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-58; AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 50.
120. England (some exceptions): P. NORTH, surpa note 4, at 241; DICEY & MORRIS,
supra note 12, at 775-83; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 609, at 432; and J. MORRIS, supra note
12, at 238-40.
Japan: Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-56.
121. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-58.
122. In common law countries, the classification of a particular issue as "procedural" has
the effect of removing that issue from the sphere of conflicts rules. The issue is decided solely
upon the basis of the laws of the forum. On the other hand, if the issue is classified as "substantive," the issue must be decided by the proper law according to the forum's conflict rules.
The distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" has caused a great deal of uncertainty
and confusion primarily because it is based upon the unrealistic assumption that there is a
precise objective point at which the two can be distinguished for all purposes. In actuality,
courts often apply the distinction in an apparently inconsistent manner. As a result, most of
the fundamental bases for the distinction disappear as almost all issues are capable of being
regarded as "substantive" in some context. See W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 154-93 (1942).
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123
acterized as procedural, and therefore governed by English law.
Yet, the remoteness of the damage or "proximate cause" element, the
liability for interest, and the rate payable on a contractual debt are

characterized as substantive, and therefore governed by the proper
24
law. 1
The two countries are also substantially similar with regard to
the inapplicability of the doctrine of renvoi.125 In England, the doctrine is said to have "no place in the law of contracts."' 126 In Japan,
under Article 29 of the Hirei, renvoi applys to a contract case only
12 7
with regard to the capacity to contract.
B.

Applicability of the ProperLaw to Types of Contracts

Although the sale of goods is a common international transaction, England and Japan have no special conflict rules for sales contracts, other than those relating to contracts generally.128 Ordinarily,
the result in English cases is that English law controls any sales con611, 613, at 424-25.
123. HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
124. Id.
612, 614, at 424, 425.
125. Renvoi is a convenient term used to denote the rule that the judge of the forum is to
consider the conflict of law rules prevailing in the country to which the forum's conflicts rule
refers, regardless of the particular law that may eventually control. E. LORENZEN, SELECTED
ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 19 (1947). The problem arises whenever any conflicts
rule refers to the "law" of a foreign country but the foreign conflicts rule would have referred
the question of the "law" to the forum or some other country. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note
12, at 54. In essence, renvoi asks the forum court to consider the conflicts rules of the country
it is directed to under its own conflicts rules as a part of the "law" to be applied to the case.
Because of the potential for an endless chain of cross-references, commentators are overwhelming opposed to renvoi. Those courts and commentators who do favor it usually agree
that the theory of renvoi should be abandoned after the first reference. E. LORENZEN, supra, at
23, 27-28.
126. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 695; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 593, at 414;
and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 214.
127. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-74. Cf Hirei arts. 29 & 3, translated in AMERICANJAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 117, 115. Article 29 provides: "[w]hen the governing law is
that of the country of a party's nationality and Japanese law is to govern according to that law,
Japanese law shall govern." Id. art. 29, translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5,
at 117. Article 3, which provides that capacity is governed by the law of the party's nationality, is set forth supra at note 111.
128. Lando, supra note 13, at 125. See, e.g., DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 791-95.
England has ratified the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) from the
1964 Hague Conventions on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods. The effect of
England's ratification, however, is minimized by two factors. Most significant is that England
ratified the ULIS with the reservation that it would apply only if the contracting parties expressly choose the ULIS as the proper law of their contract. England also adopted the reservation that the ULIS is applicable only if each party has his place of business (or habitual
residence if no place of business) in different nations which have ratified the ULIS. Lando,
supra note 13, at 126.
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tract bearing a reasonable (rather than a close) relationship to England, absent an express choice of law. 129 Yet, no case expressly adopts
such a rule,1 30 and the English courts have declined to establish any
31
presumptions for sales contracts.,
Nevertheless, England and Japan both have special conflicts
rules to determine the rights of parties over movables and immovables. Both countries generally follow the universal consensus 132 that
the lex situs, the law of the place where the subject of the right is
located, controls. In Japan, under Article 10 of the Hirei, all "real
rights"--ownership, possession, hypothec, pledge, lien and the likeof both movables and immovables are governed by lex situs.133 Therefore, lex situs determines, first, which kinds of real rights are entitled
to recognition in a Japanese court, and, second, which requirements
of registration, delivery, or possession are applicable to create or
transfer a "real right."'13 4 Lex situs also governs the passage or trans136
fer of titles 135 and the unpaid seller's right of stoppage in transitu.
In England, lex situs is applied to movables and immovables in a
slightly different manner. Lex situs governs generally all questions
concerning rights over immovables. 37 This includes the capacity to
assign or acquire an immovable, the formalities required, the validity
129. Lando, supra note 13, at 128 ("[a]lmost every known case has been held to be governed by English law").
130. Id. at 129.
131. Id.
132. Venturini, Property, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3
(1976).
133. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-66. Specifically, Article 10 states:
(1) Rights in rem in movables and immovables and rights requiring registration are
governed by the law of the place where the property concerned is situated.
(2) The acquisition and loss of rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph are
governed by the law of the place where the property concerned is situated at the time
the facts giving rise to the acquisition or loss are completed.
Hdrei art. 10, translated in AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 116.
134. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-66 to 67.
135. Id. at XIV 5-67. However, the risk of loss is governed by the proper law of the
contract. Id. at XIV 5-67 to 68. Article 10(2) of the Hirei specifically mentions acquisition
and loss of real rights-the transfer of title. See supra note 127.
136. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-68. Although this common law seller's right is not
recognized in Japan, in one case involving a subsequent purchaser of goods, the court held that
this right is a matter of "real rights" within the meaning of Article 10(1), and was therefore
governed by lex situs. Id. (citing Siebel Hagner & Co. v. The Peninsular & Oriental Steam
Navigation Co., Yokahama District Court, 8 Hyoron (Shoho) 4, Oct. 29, 1918). Thus, it is
suggested that where the original purchaser is claiming delivery of the goods, and the sales
contract and bill of lading are governed by Anglo-American law, the Japanese courts will
protect the unpaid seller's right to stoppage in transitu. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-68 to 69.
137. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 519-24; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
651-56,
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of assignments, the effect of a lapse of time upon the rights to immovables, and questions relating to monetary sums charged upon an immovable. 138 With respect to tangible movables, lex situs determines
the validity of transfers and their effect on the proprietary rights of
the parties and those claiming under them, including the seller's right
of stoppage in transitu.139 If the transfer is valid under the lex situs, it
remains valid even if the situs changes-unless the transfer was made
after the change, and even then not until it is declared invalid under
the new lex situs.14°
The application of lex situs to most issues relating to rights over
movables and immovables raises the problem of which issues are governed by lex situs and which are governed by the conflicts rules relating to contracts. This is a matter of "characterization,"141 and
depends upon whether the issue should be classified as one of property
law dealing essentially with proprietary rights, or one of contract law
dealing essentially with contractual rights. Reliance upon the distinction between proprietary rights, subject to the lex situs rules relating
to property and contractual rights and subject to the conflict rules
relating to contracts, 142 has lead to two general rules: (1) lex situs
determines the nature of assets, whether they are capable of becoming
the object of proprietary rights, and the content, limits and exercise of
at 441-43; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 288, 291-94. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 50307.
138. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 519-24; HALSBURY'S, supra note 12,
651-56,
at 441-43; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 288, 291-94. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 50307. A contract relating to immovables is nevertheless considered formally valid if it satisfies
the requirements of either the law of the place of contracting, or the proper law of the contract.
DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 523-24, 530; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 291.
139. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 525-30; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 544-45;
HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, 1657, 659, 660, at 443-45; and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 295,
297.
140. HALSBURY'S, supra note 12, $ 658, at 444; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 551;
and J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 298.
141. "Characterization" is a problem that arises because the conflict of law rules differ
depending upon the classification of an issue, just as applicable domestic law provisions differ
depending upon the classification of an issue. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 19-21; P.
NORTH, supra note 4, at 42-43. Thus, the objective is to "characterize" the issue in order to
determine which of the forum's conflict rules apply. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 43. Characterization is always performed even if it is not expressly designated. Id. In England, the classification is usually based upon the law of the forum, since judges are most familiar with English
law. Id. This approach, however, may be improper in the technical legal sense because, at
least in England, the issue of which law determines the characterization is a complex and
unresolved matter. See generally id. at 43-46; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 22-33.
142. Venturini, supra note 132, at 8.
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such rights, including acquisition; 143 and (2) the proper law of the
contract, rather than lex situs, determines the transaction underlying
the acquisition or contractual effects arising therefrom, at least with
respect to movables. 144
Japan and England also have special conflict rules pertaining to
negotiable instruments. Japan codified the 1930 and 1931 Geneva
Convention rules on negotiable instruments into the Bills of Exchange
and Promissory Notes Act and the Checks Act. 145 Under these statutes, capacity is determined primarily by the law of that party's country, 146 and formalities are governed by the place of contracting-that
is, where a party affixed its signature to the instrument. 147 The duties
and obligations of the acceptor are determined by the law of the place
where the instrument is payable, while the duties and obligations of
other parties are determined by the law of the country where they
signed the instrument.14 8 Most other issues, including questions of
acceptance and the measures to be taken in the event of loss or theft,
are determined by the law of the place where the instrument is payable. 149 The time limit for exercising the right of recourse, however, is
determined by the law of the place where the instrument is issued. 150
Section 72 of the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882151 contains some
of the English law relating to conflicts of law rules regarding negotia143. Id. at 8-9. For example, the effect of the transfer of immovables on the proprietary
rights of the parties is determined by the lex situs in England and in Japan. P. NORTH, supra
note 4, at 525, 527; Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-68.
144. Venturini, supra note 132, at 9. For example, under Japanese law, the risk of loss is
determined by the proper law of the contract. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-68. Similarly,
under English conffict rules, contractual rights and obligations under a sale of goods contract
are also governed by the proper law. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 525, 527. Additionally, in
England the essential validity of a contract relating to an immovable is governed by the proper
law of the contract, as long as the lex situs does not prevent the execution of the contract. Id.
at 510.
145. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-60 (citing the Bill of Exchange Act as Tegato Ho, Law
No. 20, 1932; and the Checks Act as Kogitte Ho, Law No. 57, 1933).
146. Id. There are exceptions to this rule, including the bilateral application of the principle of favor negotiL Id.
147. Id. (a valid subsequent instrument shall not be affected by the prior invalid
instrument).
148. Id. at XIV 5-60 to 61.
149. Id. at XIV 5-61.
150. Id.
151. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., Ch. 61, 3 Stat 188, reprintedin 3 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND

186, 227 (3d ed. 1968). Section 72 provides:

Where a bill drawn in one country is negotiated, accepted, or payable in another, the
rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties thereto are determined as follows:
(1) The validity of a bill as regards requisites in form is determined by the law of
the place of issue, and the validity as regards requisites in form of the super-
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ble instruments. Generally, Section 72 rejects the notion of a single
law governing the transaction, and instead adopts a general principle
that the liability of each contracting party is governed by the law of
the place where each separate contract is made. 5 2 An express choice
of law by the parties is prohibited by the provisions of Section 72.153
With some exceptions, formal validity of a bill is determined by the
law of the place of "issue"-the place where the bill is first delivered
to its holder-while the formal validity of each supervening contract
is determined by the law of the place where it is made.' 5 4 The Act
also declares that the interpretation of a bill or note is determined by

the law of the place where it is made. 155 Questions relating to presentment and dishonor are decided by the law of the place where the act is
done. 156 The due date of the bill is determined by the law of the place

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

vening contracts, such as acceptance, or indorsement, or acceptance supraprotest, is determined by the law of the place where such contract was made.
Provided that(a) Where a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom is not invalid by reason
only that it is not stamped in accordance with the law of the place of issue.
(b) Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom, conforms, as regards requisites in form, to the law of the United Kingdom, it may, for the purpose
of enforcing payment thereof, be treated as valid as between all persons
who negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in the United Kingdom.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the interpretation of the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance supraprotest of a bill, is determined by the law
of the place where such contract is made. Provided that where an inland bill is
indorsed in a foreign country the indorsement shall as regards the payer be
interpreted according to the law of the United Kingdom.
The duties of the holder with respect to presentment for acceptance or payment
and the necessity for or sufficiency of a protest or notice of dishonour, or otherwise, are determined by the law of the place where the act is done or the bill is
dishonored.
Where a bill is drawn out of but payable in the United Kingdom and the sum
payable is not expressed in the currency of the United Kingdom the amount
shall, in the absence of some express stipulation, be calculated according to the
rate of exchange for sight drafts at the place of payment on the day the bill is
payable.
Where a bill is drawn in one country and is payable in another, the due date
thereof is determined according to the law of the place where it is payable

Id.
152.

153.
154.

P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 252. See also DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 818-21.
P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 252. See also DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 818-21.

Section 72(1), reprintedin 3 HALSBURY'S

STATUTES OF ENGLAND

227 (3d ed. 1968).

See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 252-54; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 822-26; and J.
MORRIS, supra note 12, at 312-13.

155.

Section 72(2), reprintedin 3 HALSBURY'S

STATUTES OF ENGLAND

228 (3d ed. 1968).

See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 254-56; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 826-36; and J.
MORRIS, supra note 12, at 313-14. It has been suggested and there is some support for the
view that the term "interpretation" in this subsection could be broadly construed to include
the essential validity and effect of the contract. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 829.

156.

Section 72(3), reprintedin 3 HALSBURY'S

STATUTES OF ENGLAND

228 (3d ed. 1968).
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157

where it is payable.
Although not codified in the Act, there are also common law
rules to determine capacity, negotiability, and transfer of negotiable
instruments. Capacity to enter into a contract should be determined
by the law designated under the general contracts conflict rule. 158 In
addition, although foreign instruments are not negotiable in England
unless they are recognized by an English statute or the custom of
English merchants, 159 the effectiveness of a transfer of negotiable instruments is determined by the law of the place where the transfer
was made. 160 Finally, it is suggested that the essential validity and
effect of the instrument is governed by the1 law of either the place of
16
contracting or the place of performance.
VI.

PUBLIC POLICY-AN EVERPRESENT RESTRICTION ON THE

APPLICATION OF THE PROPER LAW
A universal rule of conflicts is that foreign law will not be applied
when its application contravenes the public policy of the forum country. 1 6 2 In the conflict of laws field, public policy serves three functions: (1) to reject foreign laws repugnant to the forum's sense of
morality and decency; (2) to prevent injustice in the special circumstances of the particular case; and (3) to affect choice of law in any
particular case. 1 63 Although the "moral repugnancy" use has declined, it remains viable because it protects a legal system from the
risk involved in opening itself up to enforcement of undesirable foreign-acquired rights. 164 Under the second function, judges retain a
"residual discretion" to avoid unjust or unconscionable results from
the sometimes harsh effect of the application of a foreign law manSee P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 255-56; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 836-37. This
provision has been criticized as being obscure and unintelligible, because it does not expressly
designate the proper law if the act is not done. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 255-56; DIcEY &
MORRIS, supra note 12, at 836-37. It is suggested, however, that the law of the place of
performance would probably be applied. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 256.
157. Section 72(5), reprintedin 3 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 228 (3d ed. 1968).
See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 257; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 839; and J. MORRIS,
supra note 12, at 317-18.
158. P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 254.
159. Id; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 311.
160. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 832-35; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 314-16.
161. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 829-30.
162. Lando, supra note 13, at 108; Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-76.
163. Note, The TraditionalView of Public Policy and Ordre Public in PrivateInternational
Law, II GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 591, 607-09 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Public Policy].
164. Id. at 607-08.
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dated by the conflicts rules.165 Finally, courts may use public policy

to reject the choice of law made by their own conflicts rules in a particular case (and typically apply the law of the forum itself), rather
than modify or change the conflicts rules altogether. 166 A common
example of this third function is the invocation of public policy to
prevent extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws,
which many countries regard as an unwarranted interference with
their internal affairs.167
Japan and England both employ the notion of public policy in
the field of conflict of law. Under Article 30 of the Hdrei, any provision of an otherwise applicable foreign law will not apply if contrary
to the "public order and good morals" of Japan. 168 One controversial
decision even held a statute of limitations to be a matter of Japanese
public policy. 169 Although the invocation of public policy under Article 30 is rare in contract cases, it has been invoked in some employment contract cases. 170 Thus, despite the unpredictability of its use
due to both the vagueness of the idea and a lack of translated material
concerning its use, public policy remains a potential tool to be used in
Japan to disregard an express, implied or otherwise mandated choice
of foreign law.
In England, the notion of public policy embodied in case law is
no more defined or predictable than in Japan. Public policy is commonly invoked to substitute English law for an otherwise applicable
165. Id. at 608.
166. Id. at 609.
167. Id. at 612.
168.

Hdrei art. 30, translatedin AMERICAN-JAPANESE PIL, supra note 5, at 117.

169. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-76 (discussing and citing Ueda v. Suzuki, Great Court
of Judicature, 23 Minroku 378, Mar. 17, 1917). Fujita also points to the decision in Cassel v.
Toko Nylon K.K., Tokushina District Court, 254 Hanrei Times 209, Dec. 16, 1966, which
questioned the validity of the Ueda case and sustained a claim for attorneys fees even though
the action would have been barred by the Japanese statute of limitation. Id. He notes, however, that the Ueda case could be distinguished from Cassel on the ground that both parties
were Japanese in Ueda. Id.
170. Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-77. !Kg., George v. International Air Service Co.,
Tokyo District Court, 16 Rodo Kershu 308, Apr. 26, 1965, translated in 10 JAPAN. ANN.
INT'L L. 189 (1966). In George, the court sustained a petition for unfair labor practices even
though the American employee of a California company had been unsuccessful in seeking
relief in the United States on the same claim. 10 JAPAN. ANN. INT'L L. at 196. The court
reasoned that "labor laws regulating labor relations do not have a nature which is common to
different nations. . . and each nation intervenes, from its own necessities in labor agreements
by which labor is actually supplied in said country." Id. at 194. Thus, since all of his work
had been performed in Japan, the court held that Article 7 of the Hdrei was inapplicable
because of the need to effectuate the Japanese public policy embodied in its labor laws. Id. at
194-95. The court then applied these Japanese labor laws to grant relief. Id.
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foreign law to determine the validity of a contract "if and insofar as
the application of foreign law would be opposed to the public policy
of English law, or to the provisions of an Act of Parliament which, by
the terms of the Act or by virtue of established principles of statutory
interpretation, applies to the contract."' 17 1 One act that falls within
this definition and could be characterized as a "directly applicable"
law is the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977,172 which limits and in
some cases negates contractual terms that attempt to restrict or exclude liability for breach of contract or negligence.17 3 Overall, how171. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 725-26; see P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 73.
172. Reprinted in 47 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 86-103 (3d ed. 1978).
173. Id; Note, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Conflict of Laws, 27 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 661, 661 (1978); and Blom, supra note 14, at 167-68. The applicability of the Act
and its consequential effect on the field of conflicts of law is set forth in Section 27, which
provides:
(1) Where the proper law of a contract is the law of any part of the United Kingdom only by choice of the parties (and apart from that choice would be the law
of some country outside the United Kingdom) sections 2 to 7 and 16 to 21 of
this Act do not operate as part of the proper law.
(2) This Act has effect notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports to apply the law of some country outside the United Kingdom, where
(either or both)(a) the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or abiter to have been imposed
wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade
the operation of this Act; or
(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as a consumer, and
he was then habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the essential
steps necessary for the making of the contract were taken there, whether
by him or by other on his behalf.
Reprinted in 47 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 100 (3d ed. 1978). See also id. at 97
(Section 12 defines "dealing as a consumer"). It is important to note, however, that under
Section 26, the Act is expressly made inapplicable to international supply contracts, which are
defined in Section 26(3) and (4) as:
(3) . . .
(a) either it is a contract of sale of goods or it is one under or in pursuance of
which the possession or ownership of goods passes; and
(b) it is made by parties whose places of business (or, if they have none, habitual residences) are in the territories of different States (the Channel Islands
and the Isle of Man being treated for this purpose as different States from
the United Kingdom).
(4) A contract fails within subsection (3) above only if either(a) the goods in question are, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in
the course of carriage, or will be carried, from the territory of one State to
the territory of another; or
(b) the acts constituting the offer and acceptance have been done in the territories of different States; or
(c) the contract provides for the goods to be delivered to territory of a State
other than that within whose territory those acts were done.
Id. at 99. See also id. at 101-02 (another exemption is stated in 29(l)(b) for contracts that
comply with an international agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party). In general,
the Act applies regardless of the fact that the parties expressly selected, or the general conflict
rules designate, some law other than England as the proper law of the contract. Blom, supra
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ever, the English courts have taken a rather "narrow," or "technical,"
view of public policy, basically restricting it to extraterritorial statutes
and common law principles of morality and decency. 17 4 The English
courts have rejected a broader view that might hold a contract contrary to public policy simply because it may be contrary to an English
75
domestic statute or rule. 1
Despite the narrow view taken, the role of public policy in the
English contracts conflict of laws field remains vague, primarily due
to the lack of cases. 176 Contracts in restraint of trade, contracts involving trade with the enemy, champertous contracts, wagering contracts, and contracts in violation of lending laws, however, have been
held contrary to English public policy, regardless of their validity
under the foreign proper law. 177 English courts have also used public
policy to enforce contracts otherwise void under the foreign proper
law. 178
There are, however, many ways in which a court may disguise its
use of public policy to apply the law of the forum.179 Courts in common law countries, such as England, may apply the substantive/procedural characterization to classify an issue as procedural in order to
justify the application of the law of the forum instead of the proper
law.' 8 0 Both Japanese and English courts use the theory of "characterization" on a substantive level to disguise their invocation of public
note 14, at 167-69; J. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 224; and Note, Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977 and the Conflict of Laws, 27 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. at 661-63.
174. Blom, supra note 14, at 183. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 145-46.
175. Blom, supra note 14, at 183. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 145-46. There are,
however, indications that such a narrow view of public policy may be declining. For example,
in the recent case of The Hollandia, [1982] 1 Q.B. 872, 873, 884, 886, 890-91, [1982] 2 W.L.R.
556, 557, 562-66, 568-69, [1982] 1 All E.R. 1076, 1080-82, 1084-86, the court invoked the
public policy of England to invalidate a provision of parties' choice of law clause that limited
the shipowner's liability contrary to the Hague rules which have been adopted in England (the
parties had selected the Netherlands as the proper law of the contract). Specifically, Lord
Denning rejected the argument that the application of England's Carriage of Goods By Sea
Act 1971 would unduly impair the parties' freedom of contract:
[T]here is a higher public policy to be considered---and that is the public policy
which demands that, in international trade, all goods carried by sea should be subject
to uniform rules governing the rights and liabilities-and the limitations of liabilityof the parties ...
This public policy. . . [i]n short, ..
applies to all international transport.
Id. at 884, [1982] 3 W.L.R. at 562, [1982] 1 All E.R. at 1080.
176. Blom, supra note 14, at 183.
177. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 727-29. See P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 149-51.
178. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 727-29.
179. See Public Policy, supra note 163, at 603-07.
180. Id. at 604.

224

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J

[Vol. 7:193

policy.181 Both countries also commonly refuse to apply foreign
"public laws," even when the foreign law is the proper law of the
contract. 8 2 Thus, by characterizing a particular foreign law as "public," the court can disregard it without expressly invoking the notion
of public policy.
Moreover, the universal notion of "directly applicable," or
mandatory rules of the forum, 183 is another way a court might implic-

itly invoke public policy. Under this theory, the validity of a contract
or one of its terms is determined in accordance with a provision of the
forum law because the law expressly or by virtue of statutory construction applies to the contract. 84 These "directly applicable" rules
can be found in the private and public law of the forum, but they
commonly take the form of trade, antitrust, or foreign investment regulations.18 5 This theory has only been applied unilaterally, allowing
181. Id. at 606-07. See Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-71. For a discussion of characterization, see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
182. Lando, supra note 13, at 108-09. See generally P. NORTH, supra note 4, at 131-37
(foreign penal and revenue laws denied application even if from the country of the proper law).
183. Lando, supra note 13, at 108-09.
184. Id; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 12, at 725-26. See Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-52.
185. Lando, supra note 13, at 107-08; and Fujita, supra note 7, at XIV 5-52. For example,
in Japan, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Gaikoku-kawase oyobi
gaikoku-hdeki kanriho, Law No. 228, 1949), the Foreign Investment Law (Gaishini kansuru
hiritsu Law No. 163, 1950), and the Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and
Methods of Preserving Fair Trade (Shiteki-dokusen no kinski gyobi kdsei-torihiki no kakuho ni
kansuru hdritsu, Law No. 54, 1947), all have the potential to effect international transactions.
JapaneseRegulations supra note 7, at 317, 319 n.6, 333 n.38, 338 n.60.
Their potential for affecting the enforceability of international contracts, however, has
been negated by the Japanese courts' classification of them as torishimari-hokr(regulatory
law), which merely makes the contract illegal but not unenforceable. Id. at 318-19. If they
had been classified as kydk6-h6ki (mandatory law), any contracts contrary to their provisions
would have been both illegal and unenforceable. Id. In general, this has been the fate of most
of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange and Control Law, and only one court has ever held
any provision of it to ky6kd-hjki; and it is of questionable validity. Id. at 319-25, 328-32. In
contrast, the Anti-Monopoly Act has clearly been established as kydkd-hdki because it embodies a strong public policy, and it appears that the Foreign Investment Law will also be classified
as kydkd-hdki because it expressly provides that noncompliance will render a contract void.
Id. at 339, 333-37.
Even where the courts have classified the applicable provision as kydkd-h6ki, it has not
had a particularly fatal affect on a party's recovery. For example, in the one case that held the
applicable provisions of the Control Law to be kydlka-hdki, recovery was permitted under the
theory of unjust enrichment. Id. at 324, 335-37. It is suggested that recovery may be permitted under this or some other theory if the contract fails to comply with applicable provisions of
the Foreign Investment Law. Id. With regard to the offensive invocation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, Japanese courts have also taken a rather relaxed attitude towards noncompliance, at
least where the contract has already been performed and third parties' rights might be affected
by retroactive application. In such cases, rather than applying the law retroactively and voiding the contract, the courts have placed the responsibility primarily on the Japanese Fair Trade
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application of the forum's rules but denying application of foreign
"directly applicable" rules. Since resort to public policy is considered
solely a national remedy, courts are reluctant to apply
foreign rules
8 6
that are not part of the proper law of the contract.
Although the operation of public policy may produce uncertainty, frustrate the intentions of the parties, and at times appear arbitrary and capricious, it is not entirely without virtue. At its root is the
forum country's interest in the outcome of disputes resolved in its
system. As one commentator has stated:
[P]ublic policy provides for a flexible response to unforeseen consequences of forum recognition of foreign acquired rights. Completely automatic operation of conflicts rules produces mechanical,
unjust and disquieting results in cases where a court may be able,
on the facts of a particular case, to fashion a more equitable outcome .

. .

. It is a necessary exception in unusual conflicts cases

where the court perceives dangerous intrusion of morally repugnant law, injustice in special circumstances, or facts so closely tied
to the forum that the court is compelled to apply local law. 187
Despite these virtues, frequent invocation of public policy can result
in forum shopping and endanger the uniformity of decision. 188 Therefore, it is suggested that courts be more tolerant of sometimes unpopular foreign law and be more cautious when determining that a
particular foreign law is contrary to the forum's public policy, or that
a particular law of the forum is "directly applicable" to the contract
at hand. 189
VII.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fundamental difference between their legal systems,
there is surprising similarity between the conflict rules of England and
Japan with respect to international contracts. Most significantly, both
countries share the underlying principle of party autonomy as reflected in their recognition of choice of law clauses and rules requiring
the courts to ascertain the parties' implied intent if they fail to express
it. Even the factors used by both courts to ascertain this implied inCommission and relied upon the possibility of a subsequent tort action for damages. Id. at 34045. Thus, overall the Japanese courts' treatment of this type of "directly applicable" rule is
strikingly liberal, in contrast to the stem, literal approach taken in England. Id. at 319.
186. Lando, supra note 13, at 38, 108, 110.
187. Public Policy, supra note 163, at 613.
188. Lando, supra note 13, at 38-39.
189. Id.
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tent are similar. Additionally, both countries have expressed concern
over inequality in bargaining power and have addressed the issue to
some degree in their conflicts of law rules for contracts. Both countries also believe that the proper law of the contract should govern
most issues arising out of the contract (Japan perhaps more so than
England), but recognize a distinction between contract and property
issues when dealing with contracts involving real or personal property, and have adopted special rules for negotiable instruments. In
fact, the few major differences between the conflict of law rules of
Japan and England for contracts can be explained in part by the difference in their respective legal systems.
The conflict of law rules of England and Japan for international
contracts present the practitioner with a somewhat complicated array
of rules depending upon the issues in dispute. The practitioner must
first determine whether the issues in dispute are really governed by
the general conflict rules for contracts, or whether the issue is one of
property rather than contracts. Even if the governing law should be
determined by the general conflict rules for contracts, the proper law
of the contract must then be determined. This of course depends
upon whether a valid choice of law clause has been included. Absent
an enforceable choice of law clause, the practitioner must argue that
the parties actually intended or should be presumed to have intended
the proposed law to apply. Once the proper law of the contract is
determined, other legal systems might still control because the proper
law may not exclusively govern that particular issue. Finally, the
practitioner should anticipate a possible invocation of the forum's
public policy or application of one of its "directly applicable" rules.
Conflict rules for international contracts should respresent the
proper balancing of the need for predictability and freedom in international trade, the interests of other countries having significant relationship to the contract, and the interests of the forum itself in
disputes resolved through it. Whether the current practices actually
represent the best accommodation of the interests involved is a question that ultimately can only be answered by the courts and legislatures in each of these countries, as well as by the parties to
international contracts.
Karen Denise Untiedt

